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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: GOALS ANU lJUN:.O,.t'J�U.t.l'4l.ir..., 
by 
John C. Crandall 
In his closely-reasoned essay, "Justice and 'Discrimination for' in Higher 
Education" Dean Golightly provides a persuasive rationale for the "reverse 
discrimination" implications of the affirmative action mandate of the Higher 
Education Guidelines, Execu tive Order 1246. 
The group morality concept is, at first blush, rather jarring to an old 
fashioned liberal, especially when it is not only placed alongside, in peaceful 
coexistence with, individual morality but also seemingly pitted against the 
cherished principle of individual rights rooted in the 14th Amendment. It is 
not until one focuses on the long run goals to be achieved by the use of the new­
old principle of rights-vested-in-groups that �t takes on an aura of pragmatic 
respectability if not the incandescence of moral validity. Viewed as a social 
instrument for achieving the realization of an integrated social system with 
de facto and de jure equality and justice for all its members affirmative action­
cum-reverse discrimination evokes the old means-ends debate. 
As Golightly points out the intended end result of this policy and practice is 
a societal condition acceptable to nationalist/separatist and integrationist alike 
a situation in which the ethics of political individualism will once again have 
full sway and the Fourteenth Amendment (like the Mississippi after Vicksburg) 
will "once again flow unvexed to the sea." 
Golightly's argument is squarely in the American pragmatic tradition and 
reflects, as William James put it in his classic essay, Pragmatism, "The attitude 
of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities 
and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences . . .  ". It is reminiscent 
of the sociological jurisprudence of the progressive era articulated and advocated 
by Roscoe Pound, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis and others, which saw 
positive law as an instrument of .adaptation and social reconstruction. Holmes 
said it succinctly, "The real justification for law is that it helps bring about the 
social ends we desire." The pragmatic test of the validity of a gove:i'hmental 
action (i.e., the determination of its social consequences) became all but the 
official doctrine of the Supreme Court in the era of the New Deal. 
Applying the doctrine of sociological jurisprudence to the issue under 
discussion the judgment would be made on the basis o f  the socially and/or 
morally desirable consequences it produces in the long run. If "discrimination 
for" can achieve the results claimed, it can be contended that overriding the 
rights of individual members of the majority during an interim period is 
justified in terms of the greater social good. Accepting that assumption, I 
confine my comments to the question of the likelihood of the social instrument, 
affirmative action cum reverse discrimination achieving the desired goals (i.e., 
can it meet the pragmatic test?) 
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Af'FIRMATIVE ACTION: GOALS AND CONSEQUENCES 
The aQswer to that que.stion must be speculative and conjectural. It is. clear, 
as Professor Golightly says, " . . .  the political morality based upon individual 
rights simply did not work in guaranteeing achievement for the majority of 
black individuals". It does not necessarily follow, however, that reverse 
discrimination will ipso facto produce de facto and de jure equality for all, 
though that is an unequivocally desirable social consequence. 
There are a number of practical problems and pitfalls in seeking its implemen­
tation. One set of problems lies in the difficulty of a continuously consistent 
operational definition of membership in a "nation" in which the special rights 
are vest,ed. Professor Golightly gives perfunctory recognition to this issue with 
reference to women pointing out " . . .  that although all women are singled out 
as if they constituted a distinct minority group some women necessarily must 
be defined as members of the majority group in some contexts." Does not the 
same problem apply to other groups recognized by the Higher Education 
Guidelines, though to a lesser extent? 
A further complication may arise-has arisen in the case of women-from 
opportunistic maneuvering of other groups or self-styled nations· demanding 
their "rightful" place on the H. E. G .  list .. And what are the relative vested 
rights of members of two or more nations when locked in head-to-head com­
petition for the same position? 
Related to this last question are the stubborn statistical constraints on 
achieving employment patterns for each group in proportion to their availability. 
This problem is sharply delineated in the lead article in the October 9, 1973 
issue of The Chronicle of Higher Education. This analysis concludes that, even 
with a massive effort, the rate of movement toward the goals will be inevitably 
slow, thus suggesting t.hat. the interim period during which the two moralities will 
coexist will indeed be a long and frustrating period for all parties concerned. 
Another question which I find bothersome: What will be the cumulative 
effect o!f a persistent use of "group membership and nationhood identification" 
as critical criterion of employment? Will it result in the swelling of the main­
stream or may it not produce a further "hardening of the categories" and a 
heightening of national antagonism? 
I raise these questions as one who acc,epts the principles of sociological 
jurisprudence and is personally and professionally concerned with the achieve-· 
ment of the goals of affirmative action. I believe that both the spirit and letter 
of that policy must l>e implemented, that employers must abandon a benign 
neutrality in employment practices and must make "additional efforts to recruit, 
employ and promote qualified members of groups formerly excluded, even if 
that exclusion cannot be traced t·o particular discriminatory action on the part 
of the employers". 
However, in the light of the questions raised above, it seems far from certain 
that the application of the group morality principle in the form of reverse 
discrimination as a social instrument will produce consequences congruent with 
the desired goals. 
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